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Detecting the gap in the existing literature of Franjo Tuđman’s political 
thought, this article comprehensively analyzes Tuđman’s nationalist ideology 
prior to the 1990s. Using a morphological approach to ideology, the article 
presents three main clusters of concepts regarding Tuđman’s ideology: the 
narrative on the nature of humankind as teleological struggle to achieve in-
dependent national states; the narrative of supranational ideologies – such as 
liberalism and communism – acting as a pure geopolitical means used by the 
great nations to subjugate small ones; and finally the narrative of the Croatian 
thousand-year long struggle to achieve an independent national state. More-
over, the article exposes how Tuđman already by the 1970s created the idea of 
an all-embracing national movement grounded in the synthesis of abovemen-
tioned teleological concept on Croatian history, which would eventually bring 
about a national reconciliation of Ustaša and the Croatian partisans in a final 
struggle for the independent state. 
Keywords: Franjo Tuđman, Nation-building, Croatian National Identity, Na-
tional Reconciliation, Historical and Natural Borders
Introduction
The majority of scholarship dealing with Franjo Tuđman’s nationalist ideas mostly 
focus on depicting how his ideas were operationalized in the 1990s.1 Assuming 
Tuđmanism to represent an exclusivist Croatian ethnic nationalism, Tuđman’s ide-
1 This article stems from research done in the scope of my PhD dissertation The Politics of Hi-
story in Croatia and Slovakia in the 1990s. I completed my dissertation while working on the 
project “Politics of National Identity and Historical Breaks” at the Faculty of Political Sciences, 
University of Zagreb, under the mentorship of Professor Tihomir Cipek. The project was fi-
nanced by the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports.
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ational system was dealt with mostly in a way to comprehend the various aspects of 
his nationalist politics. Scholars analyzed the main concepts of “Tuđmanism” and 
his central concept of national reconciliation (nacionalno pomirenje) conceptual-
ized as a peculiar “forgetting of the (Second World War) past” with the goal of re-
conciling the descendants of the Ustaše and the Partisans in order to unify around 
the struggle for an independent state. This resulted in the downplaying of the Par-
tisan antifascist legacy and a toleration of historical revisionism regarding Ustaša 
collaboration with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The core of the revisionism 
centered around the interpretation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH – Ne-
zavisna Država Hrvatska) as the manifestation of the Croatian people’s historic 
aspirations to establish its own independent state, and in respect to the reinterpre-
tation of the nature and number of victims of the notorious Jasenovac death camp 
(Radonic, 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Denich, 1994; Pavlaković, 2008, 2010; Bing, 2008, 
2012; Goldstein, I., 1993, 1995; Čulić, 1999). James Sadkovich provides a differ-
ent interpretation of Tuđmanism, denying claims of Tuđman’s exclusivist national-
ism. Instead he perceives the first Croatian president as a kind of Croatian George 
Washington, and Tuđmanism as a centrist political ideology “proposing that Croats 
finally bury their dead and get on with the future” (Sadkovich, 2008: 63); the claim 
also supported by Davor Pauković (2012). 
However, a comprehensive elaboration on Tuđman’s political ideas was given 
by Alex Bellamy (2003) and Gordana Uzelac (1998, 2006), who also dealt with his 
intellectual production before he became the first Croatian president. Besides com-
menting on the abovementioned concepts present in Tuđman’s work, both Uzelac 
and Bellamy elaborated on his subsequent nationalist ideology, such as the teleo-
logical narrative of Croatia’s historical aspirations of statehood, obsessions with 
Croatia’s position within Western civilization (in contrast to the “Eastern” Orthodox 
Serbs), and historical roots of territorial expansionism. However, both Bellamy and 
Uzelac did not offer comprehensive analyses of Tuđman’s ideas as elaborated in his 
pre-1990s writings, especially in his seminal books Great Ideas and Small Nations 
(1969), Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (1981), and Wastelands of Historical 
Reality (1989).2 Since the subtle nationalist political thought which Tuđman deve-
loped in the course of the three decades from 1960-1990 represents the ideological 
background of his national identity-building politics and policies in the 1990s, this 
article will offer concise analyses of Tuđman’s national political thought as forged 
2 Here it is important to mention the work of Ivo Goldstein (2001) and Tomislav Dulic (2009) re-
garding the controversies in Tuđman’s Wastelands of Historical Reality, especially regarding the 
revisionist interpretations of the Jasenovac death camp, and the anti-Semitic parts of this book. 
This was also discussed by journalist Marinko Čulić (1999), who elaborated the nexus between 
Tuđman’s arguments in Wastelands of Historical Reality and his politics in the 1990s.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 51, No. 5, 2014, pp. 58-79
60
in his pre-1990 writings.3 This analysis is important since it exposes the backdrop 
of Tuđman’s politics and provides an opportunity to compare his intellectual reflec-
tions prior to gaining power with the policies he implemented after becoming presi-
dent. Using a content analysis method, Uzelac argues Tuđman’s main concepts are 
his ideas on the Croatian nation and its external and internal enemies. However, this 
article argues that Tuđman’s political thought – as exposed in his writings – was 
based on three main clusters of concepts: the history of humankind and adjacent 
claims on “great ideas and small nations”, Croatian history and national identity, 
and political action. 
Tuđman’s political thought will be approached by the conceptual analyses of 
ideologies as developed by Michael Freeden and Cass Mudde, since both authors 
offer a more dynamic approach to the morphology of intellectual ideological nar-
ratives than discourse and content analyses. Freeden defines concepts as “complex 
ideas that inject order and meaning into observed and anticipated sets of political 
phenomena” (1996: 52), where ideology turns out to be “an ideational formation 
through which specific meanings, from a potentially unlimited and essentially con-
testable universe of meanings, are imparted to the widest range of political concepts 
they inevitably employ” (ibid.: 54). Furthermore, Freeden elaborates how concepts 
are arranged in specific clusters, where the most fundamental concepts of a particu-
lar ideology represent its core. This core is supported and clarified by adjacent and 
peripheral concepts, which, according to Cas Mudde, are arranged in a causal chain 
of “discovering the hierarchy of the various features that are found to be part of the 
ideology. This is done by following the direction of the argumentation and assessing 
what the prime and secondary arguments are” (Mudde, 2000: 23).
1950s-1960s: Croatizing the Partisan Antifascist Struggle
Franjo Tuđman became a communist in the late 1930s after being inspired by the 
writings of Croatia’s most renowned 20th century novelist, Miroslav Krleža, who 
eventually convinced him that only Leninism can offer a solution to both the nation-
al and social questions.4 During the Second World War, Tuđman joined Tito’s Parti-
san movement and served as a political officer in his home region of Zagorje in cen-
tral Croatia. After ending the war with the rank of major, he served in the General 
Staff of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in Belgrade, where he was finally retired 
3 An overview of Tuđman’s writings is given in Darko Hudelist’s biography of Tuđman (2004).
4 Hudelist, 2004: 47-53; Sadkovich, 2010: 48. The influence of his father on young Tuđman’s 
political orientation should not be overlooked, since the former was a prominent member of 
the Croatian Peasant Party with open left-wing sympathies (Hudelist, 2004: 14-15; Sadkovich, 
2010: 47).
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in 1960 with the rank of major-general (Hudelist, 2004: ch. 1-7; Sadkovich, 2010: 
ch. 1).
As an army officer and military historian, Tuđman was obliged to up-
hold socialist Yugoslavia’s founding myths, in particular those associated with 
the antifascist struggle, referred to as the People’s Liberation Struggle (NOB – 
Narodnooslobodilačka borba). The founding myth of the NOB was flawed from 
the very beginning by its “Manichean” conceptualization, where an equal share of 
merit and guilt was ascribed to each Yugoslav nation (Sundhaussen, 2004/2006; 
Petrungaro, 2006/2009: 89-93). The myth intended to hinder any further discussion 
of the mutual wartime atrocities by both Croats and Serbs by identifying victims 
and perpetrators “in the abstract, without specific ethnic identities or other personal 
characteristics” (Denich, 1994: 370). As a way to cement political and ideologi-
cal hegemony, the Communist Party commemorated the war as the struggle of the 
peoples of Yugoslavia against fascism, while all commemorations which could stir 
up interethnic discord were stifled. According to Bette Denich, these politics re-
sulted in the suppression of local memories of these mass scale killings, especially 
the ones perpetrated by the Ustaše against the Serb population in Croatia and Bos-
nia and Herzegovina (1994). As Denich subsequently observes, these suppressed 
traumatic memories only reinforced preexisting national sentiments, which were 
only fueled by the regime’s rather flippant politics of dealing with the crimes of the 
Ustaša regime, especially in respect to the victims of the notorious Jasenovac death 
camp, thus making way for the emergence of an unofficial narrative on the “Croa-
tian guilt”.5
The official communist narrative on the war and related questions regarding 
the Ustaša genocide started to disintegrate in the 1960 dispute between some Croat 
and Serb historians, specifically when the former tried to remove the stigma of col-
lective guilt from Croats burdened by the legacy of the Ustaša crimes (see Boban, 
1987: part III). Interestingly enough, the first clash over the founding myth of the 
NOB emerged in the late 1950s during a dispute over the intended reorganization 
of the JNA, which sought to introduce Territorial Defense Units (TO) as a kind of 
5 The concept of Croatian collective guilt stemmed from the controversial methods used to cal-
culate the number of war victims in socialist Yugoslavia. Namely, the demographic calculation 
of the number of victims amounting to 1.7 million was immediately turned into the number of 
actual human losses for the purposes of reparations. Automatically, the number between half a 
million and 700,000 was derived as the number of victims of the Jasenovac death camp symbol-
izing the Ustaša mass-scale terror. Due to the symbolism of Jasenovac, the communist authori-
ties hesitated to downplay the number of the victims. The first (incomplete) exhumation under-
taken by the authorities in 1964 and the subsequent revision of the number of victims resulted in 
a figure of about 60,000 victims. The results of this exhumation were immediately banned from 
public release (Žerjavić, 1992; Škiljan, 2009).
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national guard in each individual republic. The reorganization of the Army was to 
be conducted within the scope of the aimed overall decentralization of the political 
and economic system by the large-scale introduction of workers’ self-management 
(Bilandžić, 1999: 396-416). The TO issue eventually triggered a clash between Ar-
my centralists resisting the introduction of the TO and decentralists pushing for 
it. The clash eventually resulted in a peculiar Historikerstreit of military histori-
ans over the interpretation of the NOB founding myth, which was quite significant 
since the JNA was conceptualized as one of the foundations of the SFRJ stemming 
directly from the Partisan movement. Without entering into the details of this dis-
pute, the consequences were that the centralist faction eventually went so far as to 
minimize the significance of ethnic Croat and Slovene participation in the NOB, 
and even characterized the Croats as being resistant towards the very idea of Yugo-
slavia as a polity.6 
Early on, Tuđman distinguished himself as the most ardent proponent of the 
Army’s decentralization. In his books War against the War (1957) and The Creation 
of Socialist Yugoslavia (1960), Tuđman challenged the official myth of the NOB by 
noting the unavoidable peculiarities of the Partisan movement in each individual re-
public stemming from the particular historical contexts in which each nation found 
itself at the outbreak of the war. He justified the gradual and slow rise of ethnic 
Croat participation in the NOB not only by the fact that Croats were generally not 
directly threatened by the Ustaša terror, but also that they were hesitant to support 
the renewal of Yugoslavia considering their negative experience under Serb domi-
nation during the inter-war period. Describing how ethnic Croats quickly distanced 
themselves from the Ustaša fascist government, Tuđman subsequently insinuated 
that a majority of the drafted Home Guards (Domobrani, the NDH’s regular army) 
were not fascists since they had defected in large numbers to the Partisans. At the 
6 The centralist faction in fact sustained a hegemonic narrative of a unified People’s Liberation 
Struggle, which was forged and maintained during the 1945-1960 period when socialist Yugo-
slavia functioned as a highly centralized country. That narrative overly emphasized the massive 
army-like troops gathered around Tito and the Partisan general staff (Koren, 2012: ch. 5), essen-
tially devaluating the guerilla warfare conducted on a smaller scale by Partisan units in Croatia 
and Slovenia. Moreover, the troops around Tito consisted to a great extent of Serbs from Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Montenegrins. The supporting argument of the central-
ists was that large-scale Partisan uprisings already took place in Serbia and Montenegro by mid-
1941, unlike in Croatia, where the first units appeared only later and were dominated by Croatian 
Serbs. The centralist arguments were explicitly expressed in the book Yugoslavia in the April 
War (Jugoslavija u aprilskom ratu), written by the director of the Military Institute in Belgrade, 
General Velimir Terzić, in 1963. Although the factions were not entirely grouped according to 
national lines, the centralist faction consisted mostly of Serb and Montenegrin military historians 
(Koren, 2012: ch. 5).
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time, this argument verged on being unacceptable for the regime (Hudelist, 2004: 
ch. 9; Radonic, 2013: 239).7
Although Tuđman did not suffer any immediate penalties from these publica-
tions, a year later he was retired. He subsequently took over the leadership of the 
newly founded Institute for the History of the Worker’s Movement. The Institute 
was created by the most powerful member of the Croatian Communist Party, Vladi-
mir Bakarić, in the course of the ongoing federalization of the state in the 1960s. 
The federalization did not only mean the gradual transfer of federal power to the in-
dividual republics, but also, in the words of Rogers Brubaker, the “institutionaliza-
tion of nationhood and nationality” (Brubaker, 1996: ch. 2). In the case of Croatia, 
it meant that the political leadership in Croatia under Bakarić undertook the process 
of Croatian state- and nation-building within a socialist framework. During this na-
tion-building, however, Croatian nationality was understood primarily not in ethnic, 
but rather in civic terms (Jović, 2011). Thus the authorities founded the Institute for 
the History of the Worker’s Movement with the political aim to legitimize the au-
thenticity of the Croatian communist movement, which was occasionally contested 
by the historical burden of the NDH (Mujadžević, 2011). 
Bakarić placed Tuđman in charge of the Institute in the midst of the dispute 
over the Army decentralization. However, in the course of the 1960s, Tuđman gra-
dually developed his own interpretation of the Second World War in Croatia, going 
far beyond what the regime was able to accept. In sum, Tuđman’s “guilt” was that 
he inverted the primacy of the class-based concept at the expense of the national 
one. Assuming class and nation to be one and the very same in socialist society (a 
concept publicly promoted by the Party reformist movement known as Maspok, 
or the Croatian Spring),8 Tuđman went far beyond the permitted scope of official 
historical narratives. Firstly, Tuđman considered the 1939 Croat-Serb agreement 
(Sporazum) to have been a positive step towards the solution of the Croatian na-
tional question, which challenged its condemnation in communist historiography.9 
7 Here it is important to stress that both books were harshly attacked as plagiarisms by outstand-
ing historian Ljubo Boban, and by military historian Fabjan Trgo (Sadkovich, 2010: 65-68). 
However, the issue of plagiarism is not important for the scope of this article, since it examines 
Tuđman not as a professional historian, but as a national identity-builder. 
8 On the Croatian reform movement 1966-1972 see Rusinow, 2008.
9 The Cvetković-Maček Agreement (Sporazum), signed on 26 August 1939, is named after its 
signatories, former Yugoslav royal prime minister Dragiša Cvetković and the leader of the Croa-
tian Peasant Party, Vlatko Maček. The agreement brought about a Croatian autonomous political 
unit called the Banovina Hrvatska. The Banovina got its name after the historical role of the Ban 
(Viceroy), representing the post of the governor of autonomous Croatia in the Habsburg Mo-
narchy. The Banovina included most of the territory of present-day Croatia along with western 
Herzegovina. The Agreement was condemned by the communists as an agreement of the Croa-
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Secondly, he further nationalized the Croatian Partisan movement by emphasizing 
its autonomous character in regards to the wartime central institutions headed by 
Tito, and claimed that the NDH regular Home Guard troops functioned as a recruit-
ment base for Partisan combatants (Tuđman, 1995: 80-110; Tuđman, 1996 (1969): 
201-217, 285-293). This narrative, supported by the argument that King Aleksan-
dar’s repressive dictatorship caused the emergence of the Croatian fascist Ustaša 
movement, represented a milestone in Tuđman’s later nationalization of the antifas-
cist struggle. However, the ultimate point which triggered Tuđman’s ousting from 
the Party was his downplaying of the official number of victims of the Jasenovac 
concentration camp from 700,000 to the vague sum of “tens of thousands”, backing 
his claim quite rightly by stating that the official numbers served as a political tool 
to impose the stigma of collective guilt on the entire Croatian nation.10 Although 
Tuđman’s narrative was partly supported by the League of Croatian Communists 
highest echelons, especially regarding the number of victims, it represented a harsh 
challenge to the Party’s official legitimizing narratives and forced Bakarić to not 
only remove Tuđman from the post of director of the Institute, but also to expel him 
from the Party in 1967.11 
1970s-1990: From the Nationalist Communism to the National Reconciliation
The abovementioned narrative of Tuđman’s “Croatization” of the Partisan move-
ment was completed while he was acting as head of the historic committee of Ma-
tica Hrvatska, the cultural institution which imposed itself as a kind of parallel na-
tionalist party counter to the reformist Croatian communist leadership during the 
Croatian Spring (Irvine, 2008). It was during the last two decades of the communist 
regime that Tuđman fully developed his subtle nationalist political thought.12 His 
tian and Serbian bourgeoisies at the expense of the Serb and Croat peoples. Making a de facto 
Croatian autonomous state within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the 1939 agreement represented a 
serious challenge to the communist federal project, which politically offered much less to Croa-
tia in comparison to the Banovina (Stančić, 2002: 211-226). 
10 Tuđman was acquainted with the 1964 exhumation results from Jasenovac, and based his cal-
culation of the number of victims on these findings (Tuđman, 1995: 73-121). 
11 The claims regarding the number of Jasenovac victims were supported by most of the mem-
bers of the central committee of the League of Croatian Communists, including Bakarić. The top 
Party members saw the numbers of the 1964 excavation as a powerful means to get rid of the 
stigma of the Ustaša legacy. However, Bakarić did not consider Tuđman’s claims to be politically 
lucrative enough to be publicly released. Since he was consternated by Tuđman’s latest national-
ist historical narratives, he was far from prone to let Tuđman publicly declare his thesis on the 
Jasenovac victims (Mujadžević, 2011).
12 During his dissident years, the authorities jailed Tuđman twice. In 1971, he was sentenced 
to two years in prison for his nationalist writings during the Croatian Spring. However, he was 
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ideological interests developed towards a narrative on the nature of the history of 
humankind, on the interrelation between the national and international, finally on 
the entire span of Croatian history and national identity-building. Even more impor-
tant, Tuđman simultaneously created a kind of prospective political program aim-
ing to operationalize his ideational system. Tuđman’s departure from Yugoslavism 
was already laid out in his book Great Ideas and Small Nations (1969), and later 
expanded upon in Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (1981), where he argued: 
In contemporary times small European nations have been threatened by dena-
tionalization and assimilation; their national independence has been endangered 
by... the hegemonism and imperialism of bigger nations which use ideologies in 
various kinds to mask their domination, whether in the name of Catholic Univer-
salism, enlightened cosmopolitanism, bourgeois democracy, Nazism, Fascism, or 
socialism (Tuđman, 1981: 1). 
Hence, according to Tuđman, the political and intellectual elites of small na-
tions should throw away the illusions of the aforementioned supranational ideas and 
devote themselves wholly to nation- and state-building (Tuđman, 1981: 3). As he 
emphasized elsewhere, the concept of nationhood was one of emancipating small 
nations from both capitalist and socialist exploitation in Western and Eastern Eu-
rope respectively, as shown in the case of socialist Yugoslavia (Tuđman, 1989: 10). 
Far from legitimizing Yugoslav constitutionalism, this narrative served to develop 
Tuđman’s concept of the Croatian nation based on an organic teleology, where he 
appropriated the concepts of a pre-communist Croatian national identity and master 
narrative.
Beginning with the narrative of the federal Yugoslav government’s political 
and economic exploitation of Croatia, as well as the suppression of the Croatian lan-
guage and culture (both launched during the Croatian Spring period), Tuđman con-
structed the teleological concept of Croatian history as a thousand-year search for 
statehood in the 1970s. The concept was nothing new; it represented the bulwark of 
the entire nineteenth-twentieth century modern Croatian national identity-building 
process. Assuming Croats to be one of the oldest nations of Europe based on the al-
leged centuries-long continuity of its historical statehood, Tuđman marked 1918 to 
represent a kind of “black hole” in the national history (Tuđman, 1995: 351). Such a 
historical break was not only related to the 1918 abolition of Croatian autonomy by 
the Serb-dominated royalist Yugoslav regime, but also to the claimed continuance 
released after nine months spent in prison. The second time, in 1981, he was sentenced to three 
years in prison and five years of house arrest for giving compromising interviews to some Ger-
man and Swedish journalists. However, he served only eleven months of the sentence, but was 
practically banned from publishing and speaking in public.
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of the Greater-Serbian hegemony in socialist Yugoslavia now simply cloaked under 
the “bureaucratic centralism” of the federal government (Tuđman, 1981: 103-138). 
He argued the fact that the leading Serb communists hindered the earliest wartime 
attempts of the Croatian communists to achieve national autonomy in the future Yu-
goslav socialist federation was proof of Greater-Serbian tendencies. Here Tuđman 
especially canonized the leading wartime Croatian communist Andrija Hebrang, 
whose purge during the 1948 Tito-Stalin break was interpreted as not being due to 
his alleged Stalinism, but exclusively to his Croatian nationalism in opposition to 
the regime’s Greater-Serbian centralism (Tuđman, 1981: 117, 159; Irvine, 2008).13 
Tuđman found additional proof of alleged Serbian hegemony over Croatia in so-
cialist Yugoslavia in the neglect of both the historic and natural-right principles in 
determining the borders of socialist Croatia in the aftermath of the war.14 Finally, 
Tuđman concluded that Yugoslavia as a polity can be sustained solely in the form of 
a loose alliance of independent republics due to the inevitable competing character 
of Croat and Serb national identity-building processes. According to him, the Serb 
elites used Croatian Yugoslavism to achieve and subsequently maintain dominance 
over Croatia. Tuđman also saw the impossibility of preserving a unified Yugoslav 
state due to the intransigent cultural differences stemming from Croatia’s histori-
cal ties to Western and Catholic civilization in opposition to the Byzantine and Or-
thodox character of the Serbs (Tuđman, 1981: 140). This East-West narrative was 
nothing new; Tuđman appropriated it from the Catholic Church in Croatia, which 
was widely disseminating it in the late 1970s and early 1980s as part of an ideologi-
cal offensive against the communist regime (Perica, 2002; Spremić, 2011; Hudelist, 
13 Under Hebrang’s leadership the Croatian branch of the Partisan movement built various in-
stitutions which were almost entirely autonomous from the central Partisan governance headed 
by Tito. Moreover, Hebrang pushed for reduction of the political dominance of the Serbs in the 
Partisan movement in Croatia. As the Croatian Partisan movement had a large number of Serbs, 
particularly those who had joined early in the war to defend themselves from the Ustaša terror, 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’s politburo became worried about the possible negative ef-
fects of Hebrang’s policies. Hebrang was replaced as the head of the Croatian communists in 
late 1944 and was subsequently appointed as Minister of Industry in the post-war government. 
In 1948 Tito had him arrested for allegedly siding with Stalin, and while in prison he died under 
suspicious circumstances (Banac, 1988/1990: 90-102, 113-117, 120-126).
14 In the case of Serbia, Tuđman argued that historic and natural-right principles were taken into 
account by assigning Kosovo and Vojvodina, respectively, to the Socialist Republic of Serbia in 
1945. The Croatian historic principle was embodied by the so-called Triune Kingdom, which 
had once included eastern Syrmia and the Bay of Kotor, regions which were assigned to Serbia 
and Montenegro after the war. The natural-right principle was applicable to the parts of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Vojvodina with Croat majorities. Thus, the territories Tuđman claimed for 
Croatia approximately encompassed the territories assigned to the Banovina Hrvatska in 1939 
(Tuđman, 1981: 110-117).
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2008a, 2008b).15 The narrative of Western Croats suffering at the hands of Eastern-
Orthodox-Byzantine Serbs was already conceptualized by early 20th century Croa-
tian clerical intellectuals, most notably Ivo Pilar.16 Adopting this narrative, Tuđman 
constructed a Manichean concept of Croatian history, whereas he condemned nine-
teenth and twentieth century Croatian Yugoslavism, which he claimed stemmed 
from “the abortiveness of national consciousness due to the trendy adoption of con-
temporary ideas”. He counterposed (anti)national Croatian Yugoslavism with na-
tion- and state-building historical forces, starting with the early medieval Croatian 
princes. In his view of Croatian history, Tuđman also drew attention to the concepts 
of statehood posited by nineteenth century Croatian Party of Rights, the twentieth 
century ideas of the Croatian Peasant Party with its program of both national and 
social issues, and the role of the nationally conscious Croatian communists, repre-
sented most notably by Andrija Hebrang (Tuđman, 1995: 335-336).17 
15 In 1976 the Catholic Church in Croatia celebrated “Thirteen Centuries of Christianity in the 
Croat People”, organizing every subsequent year large-scale manifestations devoted to praising 
early medieval Croatian princes and kings important for the history of the Catholic Church in 
Croatia. These rulers were conceptualized as the earliest Croatian state-builders in the secular 
Croatian national-identity building cannon (Stančić, 2002). By disseminating the concepts of the 
oneness of the national and religious history intertwined with the historical continuity of Croa-
tian victimhood, the Church ultimately contested the regime. The final congress of the religious 
jubilee in 1984 gathered nearly half a million believers (Hudelist, 2008a). The success of the 
jubilee was a sign of the ideological delegitimizing of the regime, as well as a sign of the new 
dominant national identity-building narrative, which, in the words of Nikša Spremić, paved the 
way for the later Croatian secular nationalists, most notably Franjo Tuđman (Spremić, 2011: 52; 
Hudelist, 2008a, 2008b). 
16 Ivo Pilar (1874-1933) was a Croatian clerical intellectual and politician from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Being an ardent opponent of the creation of a South Slav state, in 1918 he wrote 
the book Die südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg. Übersichtliche Darstellung des Gesamt-
Problems [The South Slav Question and the World War: The Presentation of the Entire Problem] 
under the pseudonym L.W. Sütland. In the book Pilar elaborated on the incommensurability 
between Croats belonging to Western Catholic culture and Serbs belonging to the Eastern-Or-
thodox one, characterizing the latter as representing a kind of “kingdom of darkness”. Besides 
warning of a forthcoming hegemony of Serbs over Croats in the frame of the common state, Pi-
lar interestingly labeled Lenin’s Bolshevik revolution as a cunning penetration of the Orthodox 
civilization into the West (Pilar, 1918/1990; Matijević, 2002). It is obvious that Pilar was highly 
influenced by contemporary thought on the decline of Western civilization, most notably by Os-
wald Spengler, whose work on the decline of the West was published simultaneously with Pilar’s 
book. The impact Pilar left on Tuđman could be seen by the fact that an institute for social sci-
ences founded in Zagreb in 1992 was named after Pilar.
17 Ante Starčević was the charismatic founder the Party of the (State) Rights in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. He formulated the first modern theory of Croatian national identity, chal-
lenging the proponents of Croatian Yugoslavism propagated by his contemporaries. Starčević’s 
central concept of Croatian national identity was Croatian historical statehood, or more precisely, 
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Tuđman translated this Manichean teleological concept of Croatian national 
identity and history into politics in his “Draft of The Programmatic Thesis on the 
Croatian National and Socialist Movement” (1977). The Movement was imagined 
to embody the synthesis of “all positive factions in the social development of the 
nation” present in his abovementioned statehood teleology. The document especial-
ly emphasized the inclusion of “those who in the vortex of the Second World War 
sided with the opposition [then the Croatian Peasant Party, but also with the NDH 
apparatus – S. Đ.], but from the standpoint of the same struggle for national eman-
cipation”, excluding, however, followers of the Ustaša ideology (Tuđman, 1995: 
335-341). This narrative represents the earliest elaboration on the subsequent con-
cept of Croatian national reconciliation, which in the course of the 1990s became 
the core concept of Tuđman’s political party, the Croatian Democratic Community 
(HDZ – Hrvatska demokratska zajednica). The idea of national reconciliation was 
not entirely a new concept; both Hudelist and Slavko Goldstein already traced the 
origin of reconciliation in the writings of the notorious wartime commander of the 
Ustaša concentration camp system, Vjekoslav-Maks Luburić. After Luburić fled 
Croatia in 1945, he began advocating reconciliation between the Ustaše and Croa-
tian communists in order to unite for the common struggle for statehood (Goldstein, 
1993). It is especially important to emphasize that Luburić forged the reconcilia-
tion concept following his ideas on the continual historical Greater-Serb hegemo-
ny over Croatia starting in 1918, the one Tuđman appropriated some two decades 
later.
Tuđman’s 1977 Program also stressed the concept of “Croatia’s historical and 
natural borders”, which he had reflected upon in his earlier writings. Although 
Tuđman’s concept of borders did not resemble Luburić’s, both used very similar 
terminology.18 Thus, the 1977 Program turns out to be especially significant in re-
feudal state right. However, Starčević was not a conservative; quite the contrary, he was an ar-
dent proponent of French republican thought, and thus also perceiving the nation not as an eth-
nic, but a civic community (see Gross, 2000). Stjepan Radić (1889-1928) was a charismatic lead-
er of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), which in the first half of the twentieth century merged the 
national and social program of Croatian national- and state-building in the scope of ideology of 
agrarianism. In 1928, a Serb deputy from Montenegro shot Radić and several other HSS mem-
bers in the Yugoslav parliament, convincing many Croats that any Yugoslav state was anti-Croat 
after Radić succumbed to his wounds a few months later (see Cipek, 2001). For the history of the 
communist movement in Croatia until 1945, see Jelić, 1977. 
18 Luburić stressed that the fight for Croatian statehood undertaken under the auspices of a na-
tional reconciliation should seek to encompass Croatia’s “historical and ethnic borders” which 
he perceived to be the borders of the NDH plus the Sandžak region of southern Serbia (Hocke-
nos, 2003: 69-70). In contrast, Tuđman’s ultimate aim was to restore the borders of the Banovina 
Hrvatska.
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presenting a platform for Tuđman’s political activity starting in 1988-1989. By the 
late 1980s the communist regime in Yugoslavia loosened its travel ban and permit-
ted Tuđman, as well as some other Croatian oppositional intellectuals, to visit Croa-
tian émigré communities in Canada and the United States. Assuming a forthcoming 
democratization of the communist regime, both Tuđman and the liberals visited the 
émigrés in order to seek support for their competing future Croatian nation- and 
state-building projects. Tuđman eventually received the greatest amount of support, 
especially from the right-wing faction whose sympathies tended to be pro-NDH. 
The faction was gathered around the powerful stronghold of Herzegovina Francis-
cans in Norval, near Ontario, Canada, and in Chicago (Hudelist, 2004: 581-633).19 
While traveling to the US and Canada, Tuđman fully outlined his nationalist ideo-
logy in the book Wastelands of Historical Reality (1989). 
The book was published in a moment when the ongoing offensive of Serb 
nationalist intellectuals reached its peak, using the over-exaggerated numbers of 
Jasenovac victims in a way to push for their political goals of redressing the existing 
(con)federal constitution of socialist Yugoslavia (Jović, 2003: 340-344). Tuđman’s 
book immediately caused huge controversies due to parts reflecting certain anti-
Semitic claims, most notably due to his interpretation that anti-Semitism as one 
stemmed from the alleged Jewish “anti-nationality” and his argument that current 
Israeli politics represented a kind of “Judeo-fascism”. Indeed, the parts of the book 
dealing with the issues of the Jewish nation and the fate of Croatian Jews in the 
Jasenovac death camp truly verged on anti-Semitism.20 However, Tuđman’s con-
troversial claims about Jews were to an extent overshadowed by the challenges to 
19 Before and during the Second World War, western Herzegovina was the most notable strong-
hold of far-right Croatian nationalism. Certain Franciscans became notorious for being open 
advocates of the Ustaša regime. After the war they established communities in Chicago and in 
Norval, which functioned as centers of far-right political activity (Perica, 2002: ch. 7). 
20 Tuđman not only depicted the Jewish prisoners of the Jasenovac camp as collaborators 
(Tuđman, 1989: 128-167, 309-327), but also used very tendentious and false sources to corrobo-
rate his claim, as shown by Ivo Goldstein (2001) and Tomislav Dulic (2009). The anti-Semitic 
parts of the book raised protests both in Croatia and abroad; therefore the English translation 
of the book published in 1996 under the title Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philoso-
phy was revised by dropping out the controversial parts. Journalist Marinko Čulić considers 
Tuđman’s book almost as a fascist pamphlet (Čulić, 1999: 33-55), which in my opinion is too 
radical of a condemnation. Slavko Goldstein, one of the most outspoken critics of Tuđman’s 
Wastelands and a well-respected Croatian public intellectual, observed that “Tuđman was not an 
Ustaša or an anti-Semite, nor was he a radical Serbophobe. He was fervently obsessed with the 
ambition to become the creator of an independent Croatia, to expand its borders as far as pos-
sible, and to serve as its absolute leader” (Goldstein in Pavlaković, 2008: 128). For a different, 
far more positive-perspective reading of Wastelands, see Sadkovich, 2010: 264-273.
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the Serb nationalist exaggerations of Jasenovac victims.21 However, neither the re-
sponse to Serb nationalism nor debating the Jewish issue was the true message of 
Wastelands; the real aim was to expose the final elaboration of the author’s political 
project. Starting with the conceptualization of the history of humankind as an in-
evitable continuance of interethnic violence over dominance and territory, Tuđman 
concluded that while ethnic conflicts incite interethnic hatred, they simultaneously 
“lead to the ethnic homogenization of certain nations, to a greater harmony between 
the ethnic composition of the population and the state borders of certain countries. 
That can minimize the reasons for new acts of violence and provocation” (Tuđman, 
1996: 125).22 If this narrative on violence is related to Tuđman’s interpretation of 
Croatian Serbs as a historical “factor of disorder” in regards to the Croatian state-
building process,23 the conclusion is self-evident: the precondition to harmonic mu-
tual relations between Serbs and Croats would require future exchanges of popula-
tions. Of course, Tuđman did not state such a claim directly; however, his praising 
of the Greco-Turkish population exchange in the early 1920s, which he stated re-
presented the preconditions for “the normal national development of both coun-
tries”, leads one to conclude that in fact such an idea is implied (Tuđman, 1989: 
147). As Darko Hudelist quite convincingly argues in his biography of Tuđman, 
the first Croatian president appropriated the concept of population exchange from 
Dominik Mandić, the founder of the previously mentioned émigré community of 
Herzegovina Franciscans in North America.24 Basing his arguments on Pilar’s con-
21 The main issue of the historical revisionism undertaken in the 1980s by the Serb nationalist 
intellectuals was to (re)construct the concept of Serb historical victimization by claiming alleged 
anti-Serb policies in Tito’s Yugoslavia, and then re-launching the debate over the genocidal crimes 
committed by the Ustaše against the Serbs. This revisionism gained its political expression in the 
Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1986. The Memorandum and its use of 
the victimhood narrative represented a powerful legitimization tool for the political rise of Slobo-
dan Milošević in 1987 (Dragovic-Soso, 2002; Ramet, 2002/2005: ch. 3; also Jović, 2003: ch. 6, 7).
22 Already in his book Nationalism in Contemporary Europe Tuđman warned about the “... hard-
ships of those legacies arising from mixed populations and the existence of cases of smaller and 
larger national minorities, all of which is a result of the distant conquest campaigns and migra-
tions of the population, and also the long term denationalization rule of foreign parts” (Tuđman, 
1981: 244).
23 Tuđman claimed that from the very beginning of their settlement on Croatian territory in the 
fifteenth century, Croatian Serbs opposed the authority of the Croatian feudal diet and continued 
to contest the processes of Croatian state-building up until the present (Tuđman, 1989: 358-363). 
This narrative also represented a counterargument to the Serb nationalist narrative about the cen-
turies-long oppression of Croatian Serbs by Croatian authorities, from the feudal period up to the 
communist regime (Dragovic-Soso, 2002: ch. 2).
24 Dominik Mandić (1889-1973) served as the head of the Franciscan Province in Herzegovina 
during the inter-war period, and was subsequently appointed in Rome as the chief representative 
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cepts of Croats, Serbs, and the very nature of the Yugoslav state, Mandić, in the con-
text of the 1939 Croat-Serb agreement, published the book Croats and Serbs: Two 
Ancient Nations in which he advocated the foundation of independent Croat and 
Serb states which would agree to the partition of disputed territories and carry out 
a consensual exchange of populations (Hudelist, 2004: 506-515). Hudelist’s claim 
seems quite plausible, since Tuđman developed the concept of population exchange 
simultaneously with the establishment of close contacts with the right-wing émigré 
circles.
However, the most controversial part of the book turned out to be the one deal-
ing with the nature of the Second World War in Croatia. Although primarily con-
sisting of a response to the revisionist positions of Serbian nationalist intellectuals, 
much more relevant from the perspective of Tuđman’s ideology was his interpreta-
tion of the nature of the NDH and the related issue of wartime crimes. Tuđman laid 
the groundwork for his interpretation in his earlier book Nationalism in Contempo-
rary Europe, where he suggested that “the declaration of an independent Croatia 
following the collapse of Yugoslavia meant the realization of the goals held dear 
not only by the radical, separatist current in Croatian political life, but also by the 
majority of the Croatian people” (Tuđman, 1981: 106). In Wastelands, Tuđman in-
corporated the NDH’s wartime statehood into the broader narrative on historical 
causality by pointing out “that the declaration of an independent and free Croatian 
state initially meant the realization of the ‘centuries-old dream’, dreamt not only by 
national, but also class revolutionaries”. However, he subsequently balanced this 
claim by emphasizing the “growing and resolute” distancing of Croats from the 
Ustaša regime due to its “pro-Fascist, discriminatory methods of rule and the hand-
ing of Dalmatia over to Italy” (Tuđman, 1996: 349-350). In developing this formu-
lation in which he presented the desire for statehood in a positive light while at the 
same time condemning the regime, Tuđman emphasized that the Croatian Peasant 
Party also accepted the proclamation of Croatian independence by the Ustaše on 10 
April 1941.25 
of all the Franciscan provinces in Slavic countries in 1939. He spent the war in Rome, where he 
spoke out strongly against the Ustaša regime but advocated preserving an independent Croatian 
state. In 1945 Mandić helped several hundred individuals, including some high-ranking NDH 
officials, escape the new socialist government. He moved to Chicago in 1952, where he became 
the head of the Herzegovina Franciscans in North America (Budak, 1990). 
25 After invading Yugoslavia in April 1941, the Germans offered HSS president Vlatko Maček 
to take over the leadership of Croatia, but he refused and instead publicly called for cooperation 
with the new Ustaša regime. During the war Maček chose the politics of passivity while staying 
loyal to the Western Allies. He was initially interned by the Ustaše in the Jasenovac concentra-
tion camp and later placed under house arrest together with his family at his estate near Zagreb. 
Being distrustful of Tito’s Partisans, he fled to the United States in 1945 (Maček, 1957).
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Finally, Tuđman also discussed the wartime role of Archbishop Alojzije Ste-
pinac, who has remained a controversial figure up to the present.26 Tuđman appro-
priated not only the Church’s narrative on the archbishop, but also the archbish-
op’s interpretation of the wartime annihilations as a mutual Ustaša-Četnik-Partisan 
bloodshed perpetrated on an equal scale in the course of the war (Tuđman, 1989: 
375-388).27 Departing from the far-right interpretations of the Ustaša crimes as a 
radical reaction to the alleged Serb rebellion against the NDH and crimes commit-
ted against Croats (Škiljan, 2009), Tuđman nevertheless used Stepinac’s narrative 
in rejecting the uniqueness of the atrocities perpetrated by the Ustaše. He not only 
emphasized that the Ustaša movement’s genocidal politics were a result of the inter-
war dictatorship, but also labeled the wartime Serb Četnik movement to have been 
even more ideologically radical then the Ustaše (Tuđman, 1989: 372-375). To this 
interpretation he added his claim of “tens of thousands” of Jasenovac camp vic-
tims, which actually sounds plausible in light of the current demographic research 
which has established approximately 80,000 victims (Tuđman, 1989: 335-341).28 
As Bette Denich has noted, Tuđman offered a revisionist interpretation of the Se-
cond World War similar to the one constructed by conservative historian Ernst Nolte 
during the mid-1980s Historikerstreit in Germany (1994: 376). During the Histo-
rikerstreit, conservative German historians tended to reinterpret the Nazi crimes 
in a way to neglect their uniqueness and thus release the German national identity 
from the burden of guilt stemming from the accusations that the Holocaust was in-
26 The role of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac (1898-1960), who acted as head of the Catholic 
Church in Croatia from 1938 until his death, is still highly contested. The communist govern-
ment sentenced Stepinac in 1946 to a sixteen-year prison term for the alleged collaboration with 
the Ustaša regime. In 1951, the authorities reduced his sentence to house arrest, which Stepinac 
served in his hometown near Zagreb until his death. In the 1990s he was rehabilitated and re-
interpreted as a fervent opponent of both the fascist Ustaše and the communists (Perica, 2002; 
Despot et al., 2012). In 1999, Stepinac was even beatified by Pope John Paul II for his suffering 
after 1945. For the most balanced perspective on Stepinac’s wartime role, see Biondich, 2005, 
2006. 
27 To support the righteousness of Stepinac’s person, Tuđman furthermore elaborated on the 
archbishop’s numerous wartime condemnations of the Ustaše during various ceremonies, his 
tense relations with the radical factions of the regime, and finally the numerous examples of 
saving Jews and Serbs from the Ustaša terror. These claims were already conceptualized by the 
moderate faction of the Croatian political emigration. See Meštrović, 1969.
28 In the late 1980s two demographers, Serb Bogoljub Kočović and Croat Vladimir Žerjavić, in-
dependently calculated that the number of Jasenovac victims was around 80,000 (Škiljan, 2009). 
This number was generally accepted by non-partisan members of both the Croatian and Serbian 
scientific community, and was corroborated by the recently published individual list of victims 
compiled by the Jasenovac Memorial Center that features the names of 83,145 victims (List of 
Individual Victims of Jasenovac Concentration Camp, 2013). 
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variably a product of German culture.29 In a similar manner Tuđman’s intentions 
were to release the Croatian nation from the collective guilt stemming from the 
accusations of the genocidal nature of Croats which was manifested in the Ustaša 
crimes.30 Or, as James Sadkovich put it in a more Tuđmanist way, Tuđman’s inten-
tion was “to relieve his nation of the burden of collective guilt Tito’s regime and 
scholarly world had imposed on it after 1945” (Sadkovich, 2008: 69). Here I would 
add that Tuđman’s ultimate goal was not only to remove the guilt from the wartime 
Ustaše, including far-right émigrés, but also to rehabilitate the families and children 
of Ustaše members in Croatia (Cipek, 2009: 159-160), since both presented the con-
dition sine qua non to achieve the envisioned national reconciliation. As is shown 
by all authors writing on Tuđman, the concept of national reconciliation turned out 
to be the core ideological concept of Croatian politics in the 1990s. This “national-
izing nationalism” (Rogers Brubaker) led not only to the exclusion of Serbs from 
the Croatian political community, but also resulted in the suppression of civil soci-
ety as well as other manifestations of various democratic deficits, as nicely summa-
rized by Sabrina P. Ramet (2008).
Conclusions 
To conclude, this article explained how Franjo Tuđman gradually developed his 
synthetic and subtle nationalist political thought, based on three key clusters of con-
cepts, during the three decades of his intellectual career preceding his political one. 
The first one comprises the narrative on the history of humankind as a history of 
unavoidable inter-ethnic wars that will last until the formation of ethnically homo-
genous polities. Accompanying this vision of human history is the interpretation of 
supranational ideas as pure ideological tools used by great powers in an attempt to 
subjugate smaller nations. Thus, according to Tuđman, the national elites of small 
nations should abandon universal ideas and devote themselves unanimously to or-
ganic nationalist causes.
29 On the Historikerstreit, see Eley, 1988 and Cipek, 2006. Tuđman was also compared to Nolte 
by German historian Max Ehrenreich (Sadkovich, 2010: 267). 
30 As mentioned before, Tuđman interpreted both the nature of the Ustaše as political movement 
as well as the terror of their regime as being partly caused by the harshness of the inter-war he-
gemony of the Yugoslav royal regime over the Croats. Tuđman subsequently attributed the mass-
scale Ustaša terror not exclusively, but to a great extent, as a reaction to earlier crimes committed 
by the Četniks. Hence, similarly to Nolte, Tuđman tried to contextualize, and moreover depict as 
a copy, the crimes committed by the Ustaše. However, as Fikreta Jelić-Butić showed in the most 
comprehensive work on the Ustaše to date, the first wave of the mass-scale crimes were trig-
gered practically a few days after the NDH was declared, months before any kind of significant 
resistance movement emerged (Jelić-Butić, 1977: 163-187). For an interesting explanation on 
the causes of the cruelty of the Ustaša regime, see Payne, 2006. 
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The second cluster comprises Tuđman’s view of Croatian history as a teleo-
logical thousand-year process in achieving statehood. He locates the crucial his-
torical rupture in 1918, which represents a break in the continuity of the Croatian 
state-building process that had begun with the first early Croatian medieval feudal 
polities. Thus, Tuđman conceptualized the twentieth century as a kind of dark ages 
for the Croatian people, marked by the continuous Greater-Serbian hegemony over 
Croatia in the frame of both royal and socialist Yugoslavia. The dark ages reached 
its peak during the Croatian fraternal bloodshed during the Second World War, 
when the establishment of the NDH was considered to represent the Croatian desire 
for statehood. Without neglecting the criminal fascist character of the Ustaša re-
gime, Tuđman nevertheless relativized Ustaša crimes, labeling them as merely part 
of a long list of mutual Croat-Serb mass atrocities. The bottom line of Tuđman’s 
intentions was to provide a picture of a usable Croatian ethnic past.
Taking the abovementioned clusters of concepts as a starting point, Tuđman 
developed his political program as an all-embracing Croatian national movement 
which would bring about a historical national reconciliation. For Tuđman, the con-
ceptualized reconciliation was necessary as a precondition to achieve Croatian in-
dependence. He imagined the movement to represent the synthesis of the entire 
historical Croatian nation- and state-building thought. The synthesis would include 
the legacies of the nineteenth century Croatian Party of Rights, the twentieth cen-
tury Croatian Peasant Party, and the nationally conscious faction of Croatian com-
munists. Finally, once achieved, the Croatian independent polity should strive to 
encompass the “historic and natural borders” of the Croatian nation, which would 
be as ethnically homogenous as possible and achieved by a Croat-Serb future ex-
change of populations.
Tuđman’s ideology, as morphologically exposed in this article, provides a good 
background to further examination of its operationalization in the 1990s through 
political practice. Also, the article provides a good starting point to examine how 
in the course of the 1990s Tuđman’s ideology morphologically changed, according 
to the dynamics of overall political context. Taking into respect the findings of the 
previously mentioned studies on Tuđman, as well as some other writings such as 
Chip Gagnon’s seminal book The Myth of Ethnic War (2004), it can be tentatively 
claimed that if one had read Tuđman’s ideological writings prior to 1990, one could 
roughly predict what Tuđman’s politics would look like when implemented.
Finally, there is the issue of how to label Tuđman’s political thought, as deve-
loped prior to his political career. Gordana Uzelac claims that Tuđman’s “theoreti-
cal approach was very much Marxist, and based on ideas of historical materialism”, 
in which the Marxist concept of history is subverted to the concept of a nation exist-
ing as a “historical product and as distinctive living organism” (2006: 197). How-
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ever, as Michael Freeden has shown, “an appeal to and extra-human legitimation of 
order and orderly change” has been a core concept of conservatism (Freeden, 1996: 
409). Taking into consideration Tuđman’s organic vision of the concept of the na-
tion, as well as his appropriation of the Catholic Church’s organic narrative on Cro-
atian national-identity building processes, his nationalist thought falls into the scope 
of conservatism. However, taking into consideration Tuđman’s idea on the very na-
ture of the nation and nation-states, as well as his narrative on Croatian nation- and 
state-building, it can be claimed that Tuđman’s political thought reflects much of 
the modern radical right nativism, which Cas Mudde defines as “an ideology, which 
holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group 
(“the nation”) and that nonnative elements... are fundamentally threatening to the 
homogenous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007: 19 – italics in original). 
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